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Received December 24, 2014; accepted May 5, 2015AbstractBackground: This study aimed to evaluate the impact of diagnosis-related group (DRG) payments on health-care providers' behavior and the
potential best course of action to make a profit under a DRG payment mechanism.
Methods: This is a natural experiment study with a tertiary hospital-based dataset. Under a consecutive three-period (3 years) or 12-period (12
seasons) design, length of stay, medical cost with detailed items, the percentage of general anesthesia (GA), and the percentage of receiving
additional operations were compared. Furthermore, the differences between negative- and positive-profit groups were also examined.
Results: There was no difference in the length of stay and total medical cost after the launch of the DRG payment scheme. However, the
percentage of additional operations increased significantly. In addition, there were reduced costs of radiological images and medication, a
reduced percentage of GA, fewer patients undergoing additional operations, and a higher rate of complications or comorbidities in the “positive-
profit group.”
Conclusion: The introduction of DRG payment resulted in significantly reduced examination fee, slightly decreased medical costs without
significant difference in several detailed items, a reduced number of GA cases without statistical significance, and more patients receiving
additional operations. The possible solution to make a profit under the DRG payment scheme is to curtail the costs of radiological images and
medication, lower GA percentage, perform fewer additional operations, and correct recording of complications or comorbidities.
Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Taiwan LLC and the Chinese Medical Association. All rights reserved.
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Taiwanese residents currently benefit from nationwide
health-care coverage, which has been provided through the
compulsory National Health Insurance (NHI) scheme since
1995. There are several advantages of this system, including
easy accessibility without a referral system and low payments
with a correspondingly high quality of health care.1 In Taiwan,Conflicts of interest: The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest
related to the subject matter or materials discussed in this article.
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1726-4901/Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Taiwan LLC and the Chinese Medical Assvirtually all hospitals are under contract with the NHI, which
provides reimbursement for nearly all medical fees. However,
in response to burgeoning health-care expenditures, the Bu-
reau of National Health Insurance (BNHI) was tasked to
administer various policies, such as the global budget pro-
grams, case-payment system, and co-payment scheme.2e4
Although the global budget program was introduced to
restrain the soaring levels of health-care expenditures, the
payment system remained primarily a fee-for-service. The
hospitals were thus encouraged to provide as much medical
care as they could to compete for reimbursement within the
fee-for-service mechanism under the global budget program.2
Consequently, the diagnosis-related group (DRG) payment
system was introduced in Taiwan in 2010.ociation. All rights reserved.
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United States and was initiated by the federal government
within its Medicare program in 1983.5,6 Since then, several
additional countries adopted the DRG system as part of their
health-care systems.7 The Taiwanese version of the DRG pay-
ment system was developed by the BNHI based on the 18th
version of DRG provided by the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services and was launched in 2010. DRGs are defined
as a classification system that groups patients according to age,
sex, principal diagnosis, type of treatment, surgery, discharge
status, and the presence of complications or comorbidities.
Under the prospective payment system, hospitals are paid a
fixed fee for treating patients in a single DRG category,
regardless of the actual cost.8 By way of example, we analyzed
the patients under one DRG classification of type I tympano-
plasty because this surgery is generally considered a basic
operation and is relatively common for each level of hospitals.9
Health insurance or payment policies may affect a health-
care provider's behavior.10 Previous studies have proposed
that DRG payment has obvious influence on the medical ser-
vice content, including the patients' length of hospital stay and
the intensity of care.11,12 Most existing studies were designed
as a comparison between a pregroup and a postgroup with
equal study periods.13,14 However, there are few articles that
have evaluated the effects of DRG payment during more than
two consecutive periods. Therefore, the first goal of this study
was to elucidate the effects of DRG payment on health-care
providers' behaviors during a consecutive 3-year study
period. Moreover, the DRG payment system shifts the finan-
cial responsibility from insurers to hospitals, and therefore,
raises health-care providers' concerns regarding ongoing cost
and profit. Accordingly, the second aim of this study was to
discover an efficient method to enhance medical cost savings
under the DRG payment system to optimize the profits of
providers while also maintaining the functional work of
hospitals.
2. Methods2.1. Study populationThis is a natural experiment study with a tertiary referral
center-based dataset. We enrolled all the hospitalized patients
who underwent a major surgical procedure as type I tympa-
noplasty in the Department of Otolaryngology, Taipei Veterans
General Hospital from January 1, 2009, to December 31, 2011.
We aimed to examine the impacts of DRG payment on health-
care providers' behaviors, and first we divided these patients
into three periods, according to the launching of the Taiwanese
DRG payment system on January 1, 2010. Patients who were
identified from January 1, 2009, to December 31, 2009, were
defined as the “pre-DRG year 1,” group; from January 1, 2010,
to December 31, 2010, were defined as the “post-DRG year 1”
group; and from January 1, 2011, to December 31, 2011, as
the “post-DRG year 2” group. Second, each year was further
separated into four seasons to reform a 12-period (12 seasons)
model to observe the subtle changes of smaller periods.Moreover, to discover the points that are helpful to gain
positive profit after the introduction of the DRG payment system,
we aggregated the patients from January 1, 2010, to December
31, 2011, and divided them into the “negative-profit group” and
the “positive-profit group” (negative profit means that the reim-
bursement from DRG is less than the medical cost; by contrast,
“positive profit” indicates more payment than the actual medical
fees). The study was approved by the Institutional Review Board
of Taipei Veterans General Hospital (No. 2013-03-003E).2.2. Variables of interestWe incorporated the length of hospital stay, total medical
cost with seven detailed items (doctor visit fee, ward fee, ex-
amination fee, radiological images fee, treatment fee, medica-
tion fee, and pharmacist service fee), the percentage of general
anesthesia (GA), and the percentage of the patients who
received additional operations other than type I tympanoplasty
in the analysis of the changes in health-care providers' behaviors
in response to DRG payment. The aforementioned variables
along with the percentage of the presence of complications or
comorbidities were used in the comparison between the
“negative-profit group” and the “positive-profit group.”
In this study, we used the original “points” to present all
medical fees. One point in Taiwan DRG equals different prices in
different levels of hospitals, depending on the complexity of the
patient's care. The more complex the surgeries and medical cases
seen at the facility, the higher the price of one point. Because our
hospital was a tertiary referral center, one point equals 0.8 New
Taiwan Dollar (TWD), which is equal to US$0.0269.2.3. Statistical analysisSPSS version 17.0 was used for data management and sta-
tistical analysis. Univariate analyses were performed using a
Student t test (for continuous variables) or the Chi-square or
Fisher exact tests (for categorical variables); one-way analysis of
variance and the post hoc test were used for the comparison of
continuous variables in three (or 12) groups representing the
consecutive 3-year (or 12-season) period. Multivariate analyses
were performed using logistic regression, and linear regression
analyses were used to obtain the b weights. Variance inflation
factor (VIF) was used as an indicator of multicollinearity and a
value of 10 had been recommended as themaximum level ofVIF.
A two-tailed p < 0.05 was considered statistically significant.
3. Results
During the 3-year (consecutive) study period, there were a
total of 767 patients with the main operation of type I tym-
panoplasty performed at our institution. The pre-DRG year 1,
post-DRG year 1, and post-DRG year 2 groups included 272
patients, 255 patients, and 240 patients, respectively. Among
the negative-profit group, there were 168 patients. As for the
positive-profit group, a total of 299 patients were enrolled.
Table 1 shows the comparison between the three groups for
the 3 consecutive years. First, the length of hospital stay had
Table 1
Comparison of the length of stay, medical cost, and decision making in the three-period study groups before and after DRG introduction.
Variables Pre-DRG year 1 (n ¼ 272) Post-DRG year 1 (n ¼ 255) Post-DRG year 2 (n ¼ 240) p
Length of stay, d (mean ± SD) 4.76 ± 2.35 4.85 ± 2.19 4.52 ± 1.86 0.214
Total medical cost, point (mean ± SD)a 36,195.39 ± 16,188.93 36,506.89 ± 11,815.04 35,008.85 ± 10,007.56 0.407
Doctor visit fee (mean ± SD) 1857.66 ± 968 1875.71 ± 769.72 1738.75 ± 619.5 0.123
Ward fee (mean ± SD) 5786.4 ± 5108.56 5726.68 ± 2578.45 5336.73 ± 2190.53 0.319
Examination fee (mean ± SD) 2326.79 ± 1478.39 2329.42 ± 1506.96 2012.22 ± 1119.79 0.014*,**
Radiological images fee (mean ± SD) 512.57 ± 2075.53 421.59 ± 910.64 254.33 ± 427.05 0.098
Treatment fee (mean ± SD) 263.25 ± 837.51 236.67 ± 252.52 238.3 ± 264.48 0.818
Medication fee (mean ± SD) 2293.48 ± 3879.03 2106.38 ± 3775.04 1708.25 ± 2844.87 0.169
Pharmacist service fee (mean ± SD) 485.40 ± 194.21 489.82 ± 189.3 460.71 ± 153.02 0.157
Anesthesia type 0.350
GA, n (%) 124 (45.6) 103 (40.4) 96 (40)
LA, n (%) 148 (54.4) 152 (59.6) 144 (60)
Additional operations 0.009*
Yes, n (%) 37 (13.6) 42 (16.5) 57 (23.8)
No, n (%) 235 (86.4) 213 (83.5) 183 (76.2)
* Statistical significance, p < 0.05.
** Post hoc test showed p ¼ 0.032 between the pre-DRG year 1 and post-DRG year 2 groups; p ¼ 0.033 between the post-DRG year 1 and post-DRG year 2
groups.
DRG ¼ diagnosis-related group; GA ¼ general anesthesia; LA ¼ local anesthesia; SD ¼ standard deviation.
a 1 point in Taiwan DRG equals different prices in different levels of hospitals. For example, in our hospital, 1 point ¼ 0.8 New Taiwan Dollar (or US$0.0269).
Table 2
Comparison of the length of stay, medical cost, and decision making in the 12-season study model (4 seasons before and 8 seasons after DRG introduction).
Variables 1st season of
Pre-DRG year 1
(n ¼ 65)
2nd season of
Pre-DRG year 1
(n ¼ 59)
3rd season of
Pre-DRG year 1
(n ¼ 68)
4th season of
Pre-DRG year 1
(n ¼ 80)
1st season of
Post-DRG year 1
(n ¼ 61)
2nd season of
Post-DRG year 1
(n ¼ 52)
Length of
stay, d
(mean ± SD)
4.46 ± 1.53 4.63 ± 2.2 4.71 ± 1.84 5.14 ± 3.21 4.41 ± 1.53 5.08 ± 2.5
Total medical
cost, pointa
(mean ± SD)
33,728.6 ± 8016.15 36,948.15 ± 11,250.85 35,989.25 ± 12,209.44 37,819.73 ± 24,889.41 35,246.43 ± 10,196.53 37,628.33 ± 12,793.44
Doctor
visit fee
(mean ± SD)
1715.66 ± 498.13 1843.93 ± 737.85 1801.21 ± 618.12 2031.14 ± 1496.55 1737.21 ± 487.49 1954.42 ± 908.12
Ward fee
(mean ± SD)
5264.62 ± 1807.43 5460.00 ± 2591.73 5552.94 ± 2167.76 6649.50 ± 8766.73 5203.61 ± 1807.33 5990.77 ± 2945.10
Examination
fee
(mean ± SD)
2018.63 ± 842.82 2289.81 ± 963.17 2139.94 ± 958.63 2763.25 ± 2271.46 2136.30 ± 808.61 2624.13 ± 1837.64
Radiological
images fee
(mean ± SD)
282.54 ± 494.5 327.46 ± 696.1 532.35 ± 1087.03 819.2 ± 3613.42 341.64 ± 692.84 570.1 ± 1245.57
Treatment fee
(mean ± SD)
181.97 ± 113.9 230.39 ± 234.19 262.74 ± 273.14 353.95 ± 1509.14 214.11 ± 136.79 247.37 ± 300.96
Medication fee
(mean ± SD)
2232.75 ± 1320.91 2817.63 ± 3193.36 2377.37 ± 6117.63 1884.95 ± 3254.6 1465.84 ± 848.32 1774.23 ± 2305.18
Pharmacist
service fee
(mean ± SD)
453.54 ± 115.61 489.46 ± 190.23 477.53 ± 148.44 514.98 ± 267.42 460.2 ± 121.72 504.31 ± 212.09
Anesthesia type
GA, n (%) 24 (36.9) 29 (49.2) 34 (50.0) 37 (46.3) 24 (39.3) 21 (40.4)
LA, n (%) 41 (63.1) 30 (50.8) 34 (50.0) 43 (53.7) 37 (60.7) 31 (59.6)
Additional
operations
Yes, n (%) 7 (10.8) 11 (18.6) 9 (13.2) 10 (12.5) 12 (19.7) 10 (19.2)
No, n (%) 58 (89.2) 48 (81.4) 59 (86.8) 70 (87.5) 49 (80.3) 42 (80.8)
* Post hoc test showed p ¼ 0.027 between the 4th season of pre-DRG year 1 and the 2nd season of post-DRG year 2; p ¼ 0.012 between the 4th season of pre-DRG
year 1 and the 3rd season of post-DRG year 2.
** Statistical significance, p < 0.05.
DRG ¼ diagnosis-related group; GA ¼ general anesthesia; LA ¼ local anesthesia SD ¼ standard deviation.
a 1 point in Taiwan DRG equals different prices in different levels of hospitals. For example, in our hospital, 1 point ¼ 0.8 New Taiwan Dollar (or US$0.0269).
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ment system (4.76 days ± 2.35 days, 4.85 days ± 2.19 days,
and 4.52 days ± 1.86 days in the pre-DRG year 1, post-DRG
year 1, and post-DRG year 2 groups, respectively; p ¼ 0.214).
The total medical cost also showed no significant decrease
after DRG introduction (36,195.39 points ± 16,188.93 points;
36,506.89 points ± 11,815.04 points; and 35,008.85
points ± 10,007.56 points in the pre-DRG year 1, post-DRG
year 1, and post-DRG year 2 groups, respectively;
p ¼ 0.407). In terms of the seven detailed items of medical
cost, only the examination fee was significantly reduced not
only between the pre-DRG year 1 and post-DRG year 2 groups
but also between the post-DRG year 1 and post-DRG year 2
groups (2326.79 points ± 1478.39 points, 2329.42
points ± 1506.96 points, and 2012.22 points ± 1119.79 points
in the pre-DRG year 1, post-DRG year 1, and post-DRG year 2
groups, respectively; p ¼ 0.014; post hoc test showed
p ¼ 0.032 between the pre-DRG year 1 group and the post-
DRG year 2 group; p ¼ 0.033 between the post-DRG year 1
group and the post-DRG year 2 group). However, we also
found a slightly decreasing trend without a significant3rd season of
Post-DRG year 1
(n ¼ 66)
4th season of
Post-DRG year 1
(n ¼ 76)
1st season of
Post-DRG year 2
(n ¼ 41)
2nd seas
Post-DR
(n ¼ 49
5.20 ± 2.66 4.75 ± 1.91 4.78 ± 1.51 4.24 ±
37,738.62 ± 13,065.7 35,681.63 ± 11,231.64 33,609.15 ± 7302.47 35,683.8
2010.03 ± 971.08 1816.37 ± 631.66 1809.85 ± 484.07 1663.37
6132.42 ± 3133.76 5613.46 ± 2250.54 5640.98 ± 1780.05 5008.98
2533.59 ± 1596.27 2105.49 ± 1576.40 1907.71 ± 823.95 1878.80
570.62 ± 1121.31 254.74 ± 459.93 216.59 ± 106.2 214.69
272.5 ± 305.37 216.34 ± 237.77 211.54 ± 167.77 277.73
2913.88 ± 5879.35 2146.5 ± 3623.61 1133.27 ± 580.87 1621.51
522.67 ± 231.48 475.16 ± 174.5 474.34 ± 114.53 458.82
23 (34.8) 35 (46.1) 16 (39) 20 (40.8
43 (65.2) 41 (53.9) 25 (61) 29 (59.2
9 (13.6) 11 (14.5) 6 (14.6) 19 (38.8
57 (86.4) 65 (85.5) 35 (85.4) 30 (61.2
Table 2 (continued).difference with regard to ward fee (5786.4 points ± 5108.56
points, 5726.68 points ± 2578.45 points and 5336.73
points ± 2190.53 points in the pre-DRG year 1, post-DRG
year 1, and post-DRG year 2 groups, respectively;
p ¼ 0.319), radiological images fee (512.57 points ± 2075.53
points, 421.59 points ± 910.64 points, and 254.33
points ± 427.05 points in the pre-DRG year 1, post-DRG year
1, and post-DRG year 2 groups, respectively; p ¼ 0.098), and
medication fee (2293.48 points ± 3879.03 points, 2106.38
points ± 3775.04 points, and 1708.25 points ± 2844.87 points
in the pre-DRG year 1, post-DRG year 1, and post-DRG year 2
groups, respectively; p ¼ 0.169). Similarly, the patients who
received GA became lesser in an insignificant way (45.6%,
40.4%, and 40.0% in the pre-DRG year 1, post-DRG year 1,
and post-DRG year 2 groups, respectively; p ¼ 0.350).
Nevertheless, additional operations other than type I tympa-
noplasty occurred significantly more frequently and were more
common (13.6%, 16.5%, and 23.8% in the pre-DRG year 1,
post-DRG year 1, and post-DRG year 2 groups, respectively;
p ¼ 0.009). There was no significant difference concerning
doctor visit fee (1857.66 points ± 968 points, 1875.71on of
G year 2
)
3rd season of
Post-DRG year 2
(n ¼ 76)
4th season of
Post-DRG year 2
(n ¼ 74)
p
1.56 4.42 ± 2.25 4.66 ± 1.76 0.234
6 ± 10,674.27 33,297.78 ± 9931.08 37,094.73 ± 10,656.46 0.427
± 541.58 1728.07 ± 785.00 1760.23 ± 543.03 0.156
± 1842.76 5223.61 ± 2657.30 5501.35 ± 2078.77 0.333
± 1069.18 1936.28 ± 1281.46 2236.47 ± 1104.31 0.001*,**
± 79.03 247.89 ± 437.98 308.11 ± 620.38 0.204
± 409.29 201.76 ± 199.62 264.54 ± 242.84 0.890
± 1541.33 1992.68 ± 4160.65 1792.15 ± 2585.11 0.265
± 149.02 452.74 ± 189.94 462.59 ± 132.75 0.289
0.527
) 25 (32.9) 35 (47.3)
) 51 (67.1) 39 (52.7)
0.001*
) 9 (11.8) 23 (31.1)
) 67 (88.2) 51 (68.9)
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the pre-DRG year 1, post-DRG year 1, and post-DRG year 2
groups, respectively; p ¼ 0.123), treatment fee (263.25
points ± 837.51 points, 236.67 points ± 252.52 points, and
238.3 points ± 264.48 points in the pre-DRG year 1, post-
DRG year 1, and post-DRG year 2 groups, respectively;
p ¼ 0.818), and pharmacist service fee (485.40
points ± 194.21 points, 489.82 points ± 189.3 points, and
460.71 points ± 153.02 points in the pre-DRG year 1, post-
DRG year 1, and post-DRG year 2 groups, respectively;
p ¼ 0.157).
Table 2 shows a more detailed comparison between these
groups broken down by the 12 consecutive seasons. The re-
sults in the 12-season model mostly resembled those in the 3-
year model. Of all these variables, only the “examination fee”
and “additional operations other than type I tympanoplasty”
reached statistical significance. The examination fee signifi-
cantly reduced not only between the 4th season of pre-DRG
year 1 group and the 2nd season of post-DRG year 2 group
but also between the 4th season of pre-DRG year 1 group and
the 3rd season of post-DRG year 2 group [2763.25
points ± 2271.46 points, 1878.80 points ± 1069.18 points, and
1936.28 points ± 1281.46 points in the 4th season of pre-DRG
year 1 group, the 2nd season of post-DRG year 2 group, and
the 3rd season of post-DRG year 2 group, respectively
( p ¼ 0.001); post hoc test showed p ¼ 0.027 between the 4th
season of pre-DRG year 1 group and the 2nd season of post-
DRG year 2 group; p ¼ 0.012 between the 4th season of
pre-DRG year 1 group and the 3rd season of post-DRG year 2
group]. Additional operations other than type I tympanoplasty
were significantly more and more common in the 12 consec-
utive seasons ( p ¼ 0.001).
All factors exerted statistically significant effects on the
profit issue in univariate analyses (Table 3). Shortened length
of stay (4.02 days ± 1.41 days in the positive-profit group vs.
5.86 days ± 2.2 days in the negative-profit group; p < 0.001),
reduced costs of each of the seven detailed items, lowered
percentage of GA (16.7% in the positive-profit group vs.
81% in the negative-profit group; p < 0.001), and fewer
patients receiving additional operations (1.7% in the
positive-profit group vs. 48.2% in the negative-profit group;
p < 0.001) made the profit positive. However, the rate of
complications or comorbidities was higher in the positive-
profit group (11.7% and 4.8% in the positive-profit group
and negative-profit group, respectively; p ¼ 0.013). In
multivariate analyses, profit was gained significantly by
reducing the radiological images fee ( p < 0.001), reducing
the medication fee ( p < 0.001), lowered percentage of GA
( p < 0.001), fewer patients receiving additional operations
( p < 0.001), and higher rates of complications or comor-
bidities ( p ¼ 0.002).
Table 4 shows the importance of each variable in gaining
the profit under the DRG payment system. Model 1 showed
significant b weights in length of stay (b ¼ 12116.5;
p ¼ 0.003), anesthesia type of GA (b ¼ 7510.56; p < 0.001),
additional operations (b ¼ 9437.82; p < 0.001), and com-
plications or comorbidities (b ¼ 2733.547; p < 0.001).Nevertheless, Model 2 was reformed by excluding “length of
stay,” “doctor visit fee,” “ward fee,” and “pharmacist service
fee,” because the VIF value of these variables exceeded 10.
There were only three evident b weights in Model 2, including
anesthesia type of GA (b ¼ 8588.99; p < 0.001), additional
operations (b ¼ 8758.05; p < 0.001), and complications or
comorbidities (b ¼ 2430.22; p < 0.001).
4. Discussion
Since the implementation of DRG payment in the United
States, hospitals face a marginal profit and tend to reduce the
health-care resource.15 These changes in the behaviors of
health-care providers would be reflected by the medical ser-
vice content. Hence, we examined the changes in the medical
service content in three aspects, namely, the length of hospital
stay, medical cost and the physician's decision making about
the percentage of GA, and the percentage of patients who
received additional operations other than type I tympanoplasty.
For the sake of achieving a thorough understanding of
resource utilization, we incorporated seven detailed items of
medical cost into the analysis.
Previous studies, based on the experiences of various
countries, have demonstrated that the DRG payment system
results in a significant reduction in the length of hospital
stay.16e18 However, we found no significant changes in the
length of hospital stay after the introduction of this system in
our consecutive three-period study design. This means that
health-care providers have maintained the standard course of
hospitalization and have not given in to the temptation of
reducing medical expenditure by discharging the patients
early. A number of adverse events may be subsequently
avoided.
Health-care intensity is evaluated mainly by the number of
orders for medical services.12,19 Considering the different
charge in each different order, we used total medical cost and
its detailed content to represent health-care intensity. Existing
reports regarding the impact of DRG payment on health-care
intensity were inconclusive. Some articles indicated that
health-care intensity was reduced under the DRG payment
system,12,20 whereas other studies proposed no significant
difference in health-care intensity.12 In our study, the total
medical cost had no significant decrease in the 3-year study
period. However, with regard to each specific detailed item,
we found a slightly decreasing trend without a significant
difference on ward fee, radiological images fee, and medi-
cation fee. A possible explanation is that the DRG payment
system did exert an influence in an insignificant way on
health-care providers' behaviors, inclusive of reducing the
medical cost by releasing more low-cost wards to save ward
fee, arranging expensive temporal bone computed tomogra-
phy at outpatient service before hospitalization to reduce
radiological images fee, and prescribing high-priced
advanced antibiotics in a separate hospitalization prior to
the present hospitalization for surgery to avoid costly medi-
cation fee. It is particularly noteworthy that the fixed reim-
bursement of DRG payment is decreasing every year in
Table 3
Comparison between the positive- and negative-profit groups after implementation of DRG using univariate and multivariate analyses.
Variables Positive profit
(n ¼ 299)
Negative profit
(n ¼ 168)
Univariate analyses ( p) Multivariate analyses ( p)
Length of stay, d (mean ± SD) 4.02 ± 1.41 5.86 ± 2.2 <0.001* >0.99
Medical cost, point
Doctor visit fee (mean ± SD) 1584.64 ± 469.24 2193.13 ± 789.15 <0.001* 0.238
Ward fee (mean ± SD) 4739.73 ± 1664.45 6918.32 ± 2593.14 <0.001* >0.99
Examination fee (mean ± SD) 1950.75 ± 757.94 2410.69 ± 1629.2 0.001* 0.073
Radiological images fee (mean ± SD) 234.57 ± 375.98 524.82 ± 1072.29 0.001* <0.001*
Treatment fee (mean ± SD) 183.12 ± 189.01 324.07 ± 294.5 <0.001* 0.774
Medication fee (mean ± SD) 1075.44 ± 637.77 3103.42 ± 4174.33 <0.001* <0.001*
Pharmacist service fee (mean ± SD) 418.81 ± 104.06 574.01 ± 203.41 <0.001* 0.163
Anesthesia type <0.001* <0.001*
GA, n (%) 50 (16.7) 136 (81)
LA, n (%) 249 (83.3) 32 (19)
Additional operations <0.001* <0.001*
Yes, n (%) 5 (1.7) 81 (48.2)
No, n (%) 294 (98.3) 87 (51.8)
CC 0.013* 0.002*
Yes, n (%) 35 (11.7) 8 (4.8)
No, n (%) 264 (88.3) 160 (95.2)
* Statistical significance p < 0.05.
CC ¼ complications or comorbidities; DRG ¼ diagnosis-related group; GA ¼ general anesthesia; LA ¼ local anesthesia; SD ¼ standard deviation.
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items of medical cost, whether significant or not. This yearly
subtle adjustment of payment by the BNHI seems to be
helpful in containing costs.
Of the seven detailed items of medical cost, there was no
statistical significance concerning the doctor visit fee, treat-
ment fee, and pharmacist service fee. The dissimilarity be-
tween pharmacist service fee and medication fee is that the
pharmacist service fee depicts only the number of orders of
medication. However, the medication fee, which comprises
not only the number of orders but also the sum of diverse
charges for various orders, may give a more complete pictureTable 4
Importance of the length of stay, seven detailed items of medical cost, and each d
Variables Model 1 a
b Standard error
(Constant) 14,843.74 535.094
Length of stay, d 12,116.5 4115.959
Medical cost, point
Doctor visit fee 2.806 0.923
Ward fee 9.151 3.54
Examination fee 0.331 0.134
Radiological images fee 0.943 0.191
Treatment fee 0.018 0.661
Medication fee 0.545 0.067
Pharmacist service fee 12.406 3.373
Anesthesia type: GA 7510.56 304.079
Additional operations 9437.82 370.348
CC 2733.547 462.489
* Statistical significance, p < 0.05.
CC ¼ complications or comorbidities; DRG ¼ diagnosis-related group; GA ¼ ge
a Model 1: Adjusted R2 ¼ 0.8849.
b Model 2: Adjusted R2 ¼ 0.8272 (Model 2 is produced by excluding “length of
variance inflation factor (VIF) value of these variables are over 10 and the VIF inof the physician's behavior. Our study result may be explained
with no obvious changes in the numbers of doctor visits,
which are proportional to the length of stay, and no difference
in the number of orders of medication in contrast to a slightly
insignificant decrease of medication fee after DRG payment
was made. The physicians also provide satisfactory treatments
and postoperative care, such as suitable wound-dressing types,
to the patients who received type I tympanoplasty.
Nevertheless, only the examination fee saw a significant
decrease between the 4th season of pre-DRG year 1 group and
the 2nd season of post-DRG year 2 group and between the 4th
season of pre-DRG year 1 group and the 3rd season of post-ecision making in gaining the profit under the DRG payment system.
Model 2 b
p b Standard error p
<0.001 * 11,806.29 374.73 <0.001 *
0.003 *
0.002 *
0.010 *
0.014 * 0.75 0.16 <0.001 *
<0.001 * 0.92 0.23 <0.001 *
0.978 1.60 0.78 0.040 *
<0.001 * 0.92 0.07 <0.001 *
<0.001 *
<0.001 * 8588.99 355.53 <0.001 *
<0.001 * 8758.05 446.63 <0.001 *
<0.001 * 2430.22 559.55 <0.001 *
neral anesthesia.
stay,” “doctor visit fee,” “ward fee,” and “pharmacist service fee,” because the
dicates multicollinearity).
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medical cost. This represents an apparent decline of expensive
examinations during the 2nd year after the launch of DRG
payment. Tables 1 and 2 indicate that examination fee ac-
counts for a considerable portion of total medical cost and the
examination fee could be managed by the physicians them-
selves. As a result, it is more efficient for health-care providers
to reduce total medical cost by cutting down its substantial
portion as examination fee.
Type I tympanoplasty has been generally considered a basic
operation for chronic otitis media patients.9 This procedure
could be performed either under GA or under local anesthesia
(LA) and the expense under GA is undoubtedly higher than
that under LA due to an additional anesthesia fee. However, a
study declared that tympanoplasty performed under GA, as
opposed to LA, had significantly better results.21 Our study
result shows that GA was used lesser but without significant
difference in the 3 consecutive years (45.6%, 40.4%, and
40.0%; p ¼ 0.350). This may imply that under the financial
stress of DRG payment, physicians tend to choose LA in an
insignificant way.
Unexpectedly, additional operations other than type I
tympanoplasty were significantly more common in the
consecutive 3-year model (13.6%, 16.5%, and 23.8%;
p ¼ 0.009) and even in the 12-season model ( p ¼ 0.001). This
may be due to the rapid development of patient-centered care
in Taiwan and a misunderstanding of less disapproval and
application rates in DRG payment cases.
The DRG payment system, which is designed for cost
containment and improving hospital efficiency,19 offers health-
care providers not only an opportunity but also an obligation
to become acquainted with cost and profit. There are few
studies talking over the profit issue under the DRG system.
Therefore, this study is characteristic of comparing the two
groups, negative profit or positive profit, to seek for the
possible solution to gain the profit under the DRG payment
system.
We found that reduced costs of radiological images and
medication, lower percentage of GA, and less patients
receiving additional operations made the profit positive.
However, the rate of complications or comorbidities was un-
expectedly higher in the positive-profit group (11.7%) than
that in the “negative-profit group” (4.8%). This may reflect a
higher set payment for those patients with complications or
comorbidities under the DRG payment scheme and also re-
minds us of the importance of correct recording about the
patients' illness as comorbidities and about hospital course to
check if complications occur.
There are several limitations to our study. First, the major
limitation is the relatively small or limited study populations.
A nationwide or population-based dataset should be estab-
lished. Second, this study did not include clinical character-
istics and lacked propensity score matching and difference-in-
differences design. Third, the study group of this article is
based only on type I tympanoplasty patients, which may limit
the generalizability of the findings to the other surgeries. Thus,a multidisciplinary study with a nationwide or population-
based dataset deserves to be developed.
During the consecutive 3-year study period, the imple-
mentation of DRG payment caused significantly reduced ex-
amination fee, slightly decreased medical costs in mostly
detailed items but without significant difference, less GA cases
without statistical significance, and more patients receiving
additional operations. The possible solution to make a profit
under DRG payment is to curtail the costs of radiological
images and medication, to lower GA cases, to perform less
additional operations, and correct recording of complications
or comorbidities.
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